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The crises initiated in Mexico (1994) and in Thailand (1997) had strong spillover effects
on other countries. The Mexican crisis affected, among others, Argentina and Brazil, as
well  as Malaysia,  the Philippines, and Thailand.  The forced flotation of the Thai baht
prompted devaluations in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and South Korea, while it
provoked  direct  or indirect turbulence in both developed  and emerging markets around
the world.'
The global extent of recent crises  and  the potential  damaging consequences of
being  affected  by  contagion  continuously  attract  attention  among  economists  and
policymakers.  Most  of  the  research  concentrates  on  understanding  the  causes  and
consequences  of financial crises. In this paper, we focus on another aspect of financial
crises. We study how crisis management might change the dynamics of contagion effects.
Once a country has been affected by the spillover effects of an external crisis, which are
the policies that help resolve a crisis? On the other hand, which are the announcements
and news that negatively impact capital markets?2
In  the  previous  two  crises,  several  approaches  have  been  tried  to  avert  the
spillover  effects. For  instance, in  the  case  of the  Mexican  crisis, Argentina's  former
finance  minister  wanted  to  change  the  markets'  expectations  by  showing  a  strong
commitment  to  defend the  exchange  rate  peg.  On  March  11,  1995, The  Economist
reported:
"Mr. Cavallo has said that he would  rather  'dollarize' the economy
entirely than devalue the peso. "
While  Argentina  tried to  reinforce  the  free  convertibility  of  its  currency  during  the
Mexican  crisis,  Malaysia  attempted to  insulate  its  financial markets  from  speculative
pressure  during  the  Asia crisis.  While  accusing  foreign speculators  for  orchestrating
Malaysia's  economic crisis, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad said:
' Countries  with  both  fixed  and flexible  exchange  rates have seen their currencies  under  pressure.  Countries
with good  fundamentals  have  also experienced  turbulence  in their financial  markets.
2 "Announcements"  are policy  measures  undertaken  by the government,  like signing  an agreement  with  the
International  Monetary Fund. "News" events are  meaningful economic or political episodes--like  a
presidential  election  or the appointment  of a new finance  minister.
1"Currency trading is unnecessary unproductive and totally immoral. It
should be made illegal. " New York Times, September 21, 1997.
While Asian economies are still searching for a way to recover from the crisis and
to  prevent  potential  contagion  effects, we  are  able  to  draw  some  lessons  from  the
Mexican crisis. In this paper we analyze the experience of Argentina during the spillover
of the Mexican crisis, dubbed the "tequila effect."
Argentina presents  an excellent case study of crisis management  due to  various
reasons. First,  Argentina was arguably the most  affected country by the Mexican peso
devaluation  on  December  20,  1994, besides  Mexico  itself.  Even  though  Argentine
fundamentals were  very  different  from  Mexico's,  Argentina's  peg  to  the  dollar  and
overall financial stability were reexamined during the tequila effect. On December 28, the
central bank sold $353 millions of reserves (the largest amount since the currency board
was established). In the three months following the Mexican peso devaluation, the central
bank sold more than one third of its foreign exchange reserves. Argentina's  stock market
index plummeted 50 percent between December  19, 1994 and March  8, 1995. Argentine
bond prices fell 36 percent and the peso interest rate jumped  from  10.8 percent to  19.33
percent during  the same period. By March  11th,  1995, there was  great uncertainty on
Argentina's fortune. The Economist reported:
"The big question to the [Latin American]  region is whether recession
willforce  the Argentines to ... devalue. "
Second,  Argentina  is  a unique case  study  since  it  is  under  a  currency board
system, which  constrains its monetary policy. At least 80 percent  of the monetary base
had to be backed  by United States-dollar reserves  or other internationally  liquid assets
(not issued by the Argentine government). 3 The rest of the monetary base could be backed
by dollar-denominated bonds issued by the Argentine government. Therefore, Argentina's
policymakers needed to use alternative instruments to revert the negative external shock.
Third, Argentina's policymakers took an active role in preventing a financial crash
and  a  devaluation  of  the  peso. Finally,  Argentina  was  successful  in  controliing the
3In  1995  more  than 80 percent of the monetary  base  was backed  by international  assets. The Convertibility
Law allows  international  reserves  to be at least  two  thirds of the monetary  base, after the central  bank's  first
Board  of Directors  change.
2negative transmission. After the Asian crisis erupted, Argentina's expertise in dealing
with crises had already been internationally  acknowledged.  By September  23, 1997,  the
press reported:
"Argentines  have  an  excellent experience  in  crises  management  ...
Thailand  should  talk  to  them"  Whilliam Rhodes,  Vice-president  of
Citibank, La Nacion (newspaper),
"It was kind of strange to come from Latin America [to Asia] and try
to give  some  advice,  because for  years  it was the  reverse"  Miguel
Kiguel,  Argentina's  Finance  Undersecretary,  Dow  Jones
International.
In this paper we estimate  how different  policy announcements  and news impacted
Argentina's stock market index, Brady bond prices, and peso-deposit interest rates.
Among the announcements  and news received  by the markets we can find the following.
The central bank lowered reserve requirements--on  U.S.-dollar deposits and on peso
deposits--to  assist troubled institutions  and to reactivate  the economy. Peso deposits  in
the central  bank were automatically  converted  into U.S. dollars  to give reassurance  to the
currency  board. Rediscounts  were limited.  The central  bank charter was reformed  to gain
more flexibility to act as a lender of last resort. An agreement with the International
Monetary  Fund (IMF) was reached.  A fiduciary  fund for bank capitalization  was issued  to
support weak institutions, and a deposit insurance was established. Finally, President
Menem  was reelected and the finance  minister  was replaced.
The remainder  of the paper is organized  as follows.  Section II looks at how  capital
markets are integrated.  We estimate  to what extent  a change  in external markets  seems  to
impact  the Argentine  markets.  Section  mII  describes  in detail the announcements  and  news
received  by the markets. Section  IV studies  how each announcement  and news impacted
the short-run and long-run returns of financial variables. Section V focuses on how
announcements  and news impacted the markets' volatility. Section VI summarizes  the
results  and concludes.
3II. Integration  of Capital Markets  and Spillover  Effects
This  section  shows  that  Latin  American  capital  markets  have  become  increasingly
integrated. Asset prices from different countries tend to co-move. Therefore, an external
shock (such as the Mexican crisis) is more prone to affect other countries than in previous
years.
The wider participation of international investors in emerging markets has helped
to link these markets with  developed markets and among each other. This participation
has been facilitated by new financial instruments--including American depository receipts
(ADRs), country funds,  and  world  equity  benchmark  shares  (WEBS)--which  provide
access to assets from different countries.
It is likely that the participation  of international investors  has increased  the co-
movement  among  emerging  financial  markets,  particularly  during  crises.  Different
aspects  of  their  participation  might  be  explaining  the higher  co-movement.  First,  if
mutual fund managers need to keep a balanced portfolio across emerging markets,  they
might be induced to buy and sell assets of different countries simultaneously. Second, if
small  international investors--who  buy  the  new  financial instruments--face  a  cost  to
acquire information about each particular country, they would be less likely to distinguish
across emerging markets. Then, they would tend to sell Argentine assets when Mexican
asset  prices fall, just  as  a  precautionary  measure.  Lastly, knowing  that  international
capital might be fickle, domestic investors would discount foreign investors'  reaction and
would act consequently.
In this paper we examine the integration of Argentina's capital markets with other
capital markets in Latin America, namely Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. We also include the
U.S. as a benchmark to compare how the co-movement among Latin American markets
differs from the one with the world biggest financial market. Figure 1 plots the reaction of
capital markets around the Mexican crisis. The charts illustrate that the Latin American
markets moved jointly, suggesting the presence of spillover effects.
4Figure 1
Evolution of International Capital Markets During the Mexican Crisis
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5Several papers  analyze  the  issue  of  co-movement.  For  instance,  Calvo  and
Reinhart  (1995) work with  weekly returns  on equities and Brady bonds for Asian  and
Latin American emerging markets, concluding that there is some evidence of the Mexican
crisis spreading to other Latin American countries. Valdes (1996) uses secondary market
debt  prices  and  country  credit  ratings  to  show  contagion  in  Latin  America.  He
demonstrates  that  fundamentals  are  unable  to  explain  cross-country  co-movement  of
creditworthiness. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) show that the probability of a
speculative attack increases when there is a crisis somewhere else in the world. They also
suggest that trade was the dominant channel of transmission of the crisis. From another
perspective, Frankel and Schmukler  (1997)  analyze how the crisis  was  transmitted  to
other countries using data on country funds. On the other hand, using data on total return
on  individual  stocks,  Wolf  (1997)  fails  to  find  strong evidence  of  contagion  after
controlling for sectoral composition.
Following the methodology  used  in the  literature, we first  compute  correlation
matrices for changes in daily stock market indexes, Brady bond prices, and interest rates.
We calculate correlation matrices  as a way to  analyze the degree of cross-country  co-
movement. We do not  control  for  fundamentals  since we  are primarily  interested  in
observing to what extent markets are linked. We are not trying to determine what explains
the spillover of shocks. We obtain correlation matrices for the pre-Mexican crisis period
(January  1992-December 1994), the crisis period  (December 1994-June 1995), and the
post-crisis period (July 1995-July 1997) to look at changes in co-movement at different
points in time. 4
Our results  from the  stock  and  bond  market  correlation matrices--displayed  in
Table  1--show  some  interesting  facts.  First,  Latin  American  markets  have  higher
correlations among themselves than their correlations with the U.S. Second, Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico appear to be more linked in the post-crisis subperiod than in the pre-
crisis  one. For example, the bond price  correlation between Brazil and Argentina  goes
from 41 to 69 percent, while the one between Brazil and Mexico rises from 31 to 64
4  We also compute  correlations  for the entire sample period. They lie between the low and high values
found  in the subperiod  correlations.
6Table I
Correlation Matrices of Stock Prices, Bond Prices and Interest Rates in Different Sub-periods
Stock  Prkes (Daily changes)
Janua,y2nd,  1992-December  191h,  1994  December  20th,  1994-June 30th,1995  July 3rd, 1995-July 10th,  1997
First  dcfferences  of  ogs  First  dfferee  of bogs  First  dfferences  of lgs
N.  fObs.  741  N.do  Obs. 133  N.of  bs. 829
MG  BRA  cM  MEX  USA  ARG  MA  CHI  MEX  uSA  MG  BRA  Cai  fmEX  USA
MG  I  MG  1  MG  I
BA  0.19  I1  BRA  0.B0  RA  0.45  -
OHt  0.19  0.15  1  cm  0.68  0.78  1  cm  0.19  0.16  1
MEX  0.14  0.14  1  MEX  0.47  0.38  0.32  1  MiEX  0.42  0.29  0.18  I
USA  0.14  0.09  0.15  0.24  1  USA  0.23  0.27  0.28  0.22  USA  0.21  014  0.04  0.21
T159.70  RTeSt  - 270t51  LR  Test  278.9 
Degrees  of feedoM  10  Degrefe  of  freedom  10  Degrees  of  freedm  10
Botnd  Prices (Daily  changes)
January  2nd,  1992  - December  19th,  1994  December  20th,  1994  -June 30th,  1995  July 3rd, 1995- July 10th,  1997
Fist dffernce  of  logs  Fist dfferences  of logs  First differences  of os
N. of Obs.  367  N. of Obs. 133  N. of Obs.  507
-i  AMG  BRA  k  MEX  USA  ARG  BRA  VEX  USA  ARG  BRA  MEX  USA
MG  1  MRG  I  ARG  I
BRA  0.41  1  BRA  0.81  1  BRA  0.69  1
MEX  0.85  0.31  1  MEX  0.81  0.76  1  MEX  0.64  0.64  1
USA  039  0.20  0.31  USA  0.12  0.10  0.04  1  US  0.28  0.22  0.17
iRTest  33440  . LRTest  300.16  LRTest  678.71...
Degees  of  eedom  a  Degrees  of freedom  6  Degrees  of  freedom  6
Interest Rates (Daily  changes)
January  2nd,  1992  - December  19Ith,  1994  December  20th,  1994  -June 30th,  1995  July 3rd,  1995- July 10th,  1997
Fist dfferences  of lgs  Faist  differences  of logs  Fikst  dfferences  of bgs
N. odObs.  527  N.  of Obs. 129  N. of Obs.  485
ARG  LhEX  USA  ARG  MEX  USA  ARG  MEX  USA
MG  I  _AG  I  MG  i
MEX  0.03  1  MEX  0.03  M  MEX  -|406  1
USA  -0.06  -0.07  1  USA  I0.1  0.08  I  USA  -0.01  0.00 F  1i
LR  Test  2.65  LRTest  1.11  IRTest  0.81
Degrees  f freedom  3  Degrees  of freedom  3  Degrees  of freedom  3percent. Analogous evidence is found for the stock market indexes in Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico. The correlations with Chile and with  the U.S. do not display clear changes
across these two subperiods.
A third conclusion from these results is that during the crisis period the correlation
coefficients  rise  substantially. For  instance,  the  correlations  among  the  Argentine,
Brazilian, and Mexican bond prices rise to near 80 percent. While the correlations among
the Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, and Mexican stock markets increase significantly with
respect  to the pre-crisis period. For example, the  correlation between Chile and Brazil
jumps  from  15 percent to 78 percent. On the other hand,  the correlations with the U.S.
bond market become lower, whereas no clear pattem arises from the stock market.
The  correlations  for the stock  market  indexes  and  for  the bond  prices  in  all
subperiods are statistically significant (except for some of the correlations with the U.S.).
The  likelihood  ratio  tests  reject the null  hypothesis  that  the  correlation  matrices  are
diagonal. Under the null hypotheses of no correlation, the likelihood ratio test -NlogfRj is
distributed as a x2 with 0.5p(p-1) degrees of freedom (where IRI  is the determinant of the
correlation matrix, and p is the number of series under analysis). 5 These results imply that
joint  correlations within stock and bond markets are statistically different from zero. On
the other hand, the correlations among Argentine, Mexican, and U.S. interest rates appear
neither individually or jointly significant. This might be the result of different monetary
policies followed in each country.
As an alternative technique, we use factor analysis to study the link among stock
prices,  debt  prices,  and  interest  rates  across  countries.  This  technique  helps  us  to
determine  how  to  group the  series.  We  calculate  the  eigenvalues  of  the  correlation
matrices to decide how many factors account for the variance in the series. Table 2 shows
that the first two  factors explain at least around  90 percent of the total variance of the
series. The eigenvalues of the second factors are not greater than 1. Depending on what
proportion of  the variance the second  factor explains,  we  decide to retain  one or two
5 See  Pindyck  and Rotemberg  (1990).
8factors. In general, two factors explain above 90 percent  of the variance, while the first
factor captures around 70 or 80 percent of the variance.6
Next,  we  look  at  factor loadings, which  stand  for the  correlation between the
variables and the factors. We want to study which factors have high and low loadings for
each variable. In order  to  interpret factor loadings more  easily we perfonn  a varimax
rotation. 7 The pattern that results from the rotation is quite interesting. In the case of stock
market indexes, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and the U.S. have one factor in common, whereas
Argentina  is explained  by a different factor during  the pre-crisis  period. These results
change when  we  analyze the other subperiods. During  the  crisis,  all Latin  American
market indexes are explained by one factor, while the Dow Jones is explained by another
factor. In the post-crisis period, Chile seems to be explained by a different factor, but the
second eigenvalue is very low. One factor may be well explaining all stock markets--what
is supported by the fact that all countries have a positive significant weight in both factor
loadings.
When looking at the bond market, Latin American bond prices are explained by
one factor in all subperiods, while the U.S. Treasury bill is explained by a different factor.
With  respect  to  interest  rates,  the  correlation  between  the  factors  and  the  variables
suggests the presence of two groups: Argentina and Mexico on one side, and the U.S. on
the other. In the post-crisis period, the U.S. interest rate also seems to have a significant
weight in the factor that explains Argentina and Mexico.
Our correlation  and factor analysis results indicate that  Latin American markets
tend  to move  together  and  are influenced by  a different  factor  than the U.S.  market,
particularly  during  a  crisis  period.  This  might  be  the  combination  of  different
circumstances.  Latin  American  countries might  share  common  fundamentals, so their
capital markets move together. Investors might perceive these countries as being similar
(even though they are not), and react accordingly. Institutional factors (like the way fund
6 The eigenvalues  of the other factors  are significantly  less than one. Since they explain  a very  small  fraction
of the variance,  we decided to work  with  at most 2 factors.
7 The varirnax  rotation maximizes  the variance  of factor  loadings  across  variables  for each factor.  Its goal  is
to display  a clearer  pattern of loadings,  factors  that are clearly marked  by high loadings for some variables
and low  loadings  for others.
9Table 2
Factor  Analysis of Stock Prices,  Bond  Prices, and Interest Rates
Before the Crisis  During the Crisis  After the Crisis
1/1/1992-12/19/94  12/20/1994-6/30/95  7/3/1995-7/10/97
Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 1  Factor 2
Stock Prices
Eigenvalues
Absolute Value:  3.53  1.01  4.17  0.68  4.50  0.37
Percentaje  of  the  total  variance
explained:  71%  20%  83%  14%  90%  7%
Normalized Factor Loadings After Varimax Rotation:
Argentina  0.06  -1.00  0.93  -0.34  0.86  0.48
Brazil  0.87  -0.06  0.93  -0.30  0.79  0.58
Chile  0.98  -0.05  0.97  -0.16  0.39  0.92
Mexico  0.94  -0.02  0.90  -0.38  0.91  0.38
USA  0.94  0.04  -0.26  0.96  0.91  0.38
Bond Prices
Eigenvalues
Absolute Value:  2.81  0.92  3.42  0.50  3.17  0.78
Percentaje  of  the  total  variance
explained:  70%  23%  86%  13%  79%  20%
Normalized Factor Loadings After Varimnax  Rotation:
Argentina  -0.92  -0.31  0.96  -0.24  0.98  -0.15
Brazil  -0.82  -0.41  0.84  -0.50  0.97  -0.22
Mexico  -0.97  0.05  0.89  -0.43  0.96  -0.27
USA  -0.13  -0.98  -0.32  0.94  -0.20  -0.98
Interest Rates
Eigenvalues
Absolute Value:  1.68  1.00  2.31  0.60  2.41  0.41
Percentaje  of  the  total  variance
explained:  56%  33%  77%  20%  80%  14%
Nonnalized Factor Loadings After Varimax Rotation:
Argentina  0.87  0.28  -0.94  -0.28  0.94  0.59
Mexico  0.92  -0.11  -0.94  -0.27  0.88  0.29
USA  -0.05  -0.99  -0.26  -0.96  0.86  0.94
10managers  trade and the participation  of international  investors)  might be connecting  Latin
American  capital  markets.
Our results might also be a consequence  of the location  where each market trades.
The assets that trade in the same market seem  to have a higher co-movement,  aside from
their origin. Brady bonds were always traded in the U.S. secondary  markets, and they
show high co-movement  across Latin America  regardless  of the subperiods  we consider.
Their correlations  are always higher than the stock market correlations. On the other
hand, the U.S. Treasury bill appears as an alternative to the  Latin American bonds,
particularly  during and after the crisis. When looking  at the stock market indexes we find
that Argentina  is explained  by the same factor  that explains  the other countries  after 1994.
This is consistent with the fact that Argentina has become more integrated with the
international  capital  markets over time, for example,  by trading  ADRs in New York. 8
To conclude, both  the correlation matrices and the factor analysis show that
capital markets are interconnected.  This explains why the shock in Mexico triggered a
similar  reaction  in  Latin  American capital markets including Argentina. Similar
fundamentals  or contagion might be explaining  this co-movement.  Figure 1 shows how
bond prices, stock prices, and interest rates moved  together  during the Mexican crisis of
December 1994. Given that the spillover made Argentine  markets fall, the rest of the
paper investigates  which announcement  helped  in the recovery.
III. Announcements and News
Mexican  policymakers  decided to widen the exchange  rate band on December  20, 1994.
By December  22, the Mexican peso was allowed  to float due to intense pressure in the
foreign  exchange  market. In the period December  19-27,  the Argentine  stock market fell
around 17 percent,  Argentine  bond prices fell 12 percent,  and the Argentine peso-deposit
interest rate rose 1 percentage  point. In order  to modify  this trend, starting on December
8 We believe that more research is necessary to understand the pattern of capital markets integration,
however,  this topic  is beyond the goal of this paper.
1128, Argentine policymakers began to send signals to the markets. A description of all the
policy announcements and news the markets received follows. 9
1) Reserve requirements  on  U.S. dollar  deposits were relaxed  - December  28.
1994: After the devaluation of the Mexican peso, holders of the Argentine peso revised
their  expectations  about the  sustainability  of  the  exchange rate  peg.  Therefore,  they
increased their holdings of U.S. dollars. In order to provide liquidity to the banks, reserve
requirements on U.S. dollar deposits were lowered retroactively. 10
2) Reserve requirements  on peso  deposits  were reduced - January  12.  1994: A
few days after the devaluation of the Mexican peso, concerns about future defaults lead
depositors  to  withdraw  their  money  from  private  banks to  exchange  their  pesos  for
dollars.  In  order  to  alleviate  the  pressure  from  banks, reserve requirements  on  peso
deposits were lowered retroactively to the same level on foreign currency deposits. Banks
were also allowed to maintain their required reserves in either currency.
The following charts illustrate  how  dollar  and peso reserve requirements  were
modified following the Mexican peso devaluation.
|___________  Reserve  Requirements  (Percent)
Argentine  Pesos  U.S.  Dollars
Checking  Savings  Time  Checking  Savings  Time
Period  Account  Account  Deposit  Account  Account  Deposit
8/93-  43  43  3  43  43  3
12/15/94
12/16194-  43  43  3  35  35  1
12/31/94
01/01/95-  35  35  1  35  35  1
01/15/95
01/16/95-  30  30  1  30  30  1
01/31/95  . .
02/01/95-  32  32  1  32  32  1
02/28195
03/01/95-  33  33  2  33  33  2
07/31/95
9 A detailed description  of the news can be found in the Argentine  central bank and finance rninistry
regulations  (Comunicaciones  "A" 2293, 2307, 2315, 2317, 2338, 2350, 2298, 2308, Decreto 290/95,
286/95, and 445/95, Ley 24.485) as well as  in the newspapers Ambito Financiero and  El Cronista
Comercial.
10  The retroactive  lowering  of reserve requirements  was a mean to alleviate  the banks' financial  iliquidity.
Reserve requirements  are calculated as a  30-day average, then retroactive  lower reserve requirements
helped  banks  to substantially  decrease  the cash  they needed to deposit  in the central  bank.
123) Bank deposits in the central bank were-dollarized - Januarv 12. 1995: In order
to give additional support to the currency board, the central bank decided to dollarize the
financial  institutions'  peso  deposits  held  by  the  central  bank.  The  purpose  of  the
dollarization  was to  give confidence  to  the  markets  by  decreasing the  central bank
incentives to reduce its peso-denominated debt, through a devaluation of the peso.
4) A  public  safety net  was established  - Januarv  12. 1995: The central bank
constituted  a fund to help  institutions,  by purchasing  their non-performing  loans. All
banks gave 2 percent of their deposits to establish the 700 million fund (administered by
Banco Nacion). The fund provided a safety net  to the system. By mid  1997, the non-
performing  loans were paid back to  Banco Nacion,  and the shareholders (the banking
sector) recovered their initial capital.
5)  The  use  of  rediscounts  was  limited  - February  3.  1995:  Before  the
convertibility plan, rediscounts were frequently used to alleviate iliquidity problems faced
by financial institutions. However, they could have been channeled to speculation during
financial stress. Moreover, rediscounts could have been used to take  advantage of the
differential between the rediscounts rate and the interbank rates. This differential usually
increases  during  crises.  To  avoid  an  undesired  use  of  rediscounts, the  central bank
established some limits on how financial institutions  could take advantage of them. Banks
were forbidden to use rediscounts to buy back their debt, they were only allowed to use
rediscounts to return deposits.
6) Modification of the central bank charter - February 27. 1995: The central bank
acquired more flexibility to assist troubled financial institutions. First, the time limit for
financial assistance was extended from 30 days to 120 days. Second, financial assistance
could exceed the net worth of financial institutions.  Finally, the central bank could decide
how to use the assets acquired from troubled institutions.
7) Relaxation of reserve requirements -March  10. 1995: As another instrument to
lower reserve requirements, the Argentine central bank allowed private banks to use 50
percent of their cash as reserve requirements. Through this mechanism, minimum reserve
requirements did not need to be modified, but actual reserve requirements changed. After
13May 31 1995, this 50 percent returned gradually to 0. An increase in this measure implies
lower reserve requirements.
8) Announcement  of an agreement with the IMF (to be signed four days later) -
March  10. 1995: The Argentine government  signed  an agreement with the IMF. Under
this agreement Argentina accepted to be monitored  by the IMF. At the same time, the
Argentine government gained access to international credit for roughly 7 billion dollars.
9) Creation of a fiduciara fund for bank capitalization  - March 28. 1995: A fund
was established to help troubled financial institutions,  by giving them additional credit.
The fund was also meant to restructure the fragile financial system, by purchasing non-
performing loans (which were going to be sold later). The fund was established by issuing
a bond, with the help of 500 million dollars committed by the World Bank. Bondholders,
the finance ministry, and the central bank managed the fund."  l
10)  Establishment  of  deposit  insurance  - April  4.  1995:  In  order  to  give
confidence  to  the  financial  sector, a  deposit  insurance  system  was  established.  The
insurance  is  administered  by  a  private  institution  (SEDESA).  The central  bank,  the
finance minister,  and  commercial banks participate  in SEDESA's  board. The financial
institutions absorb the cost of the fund. Each bank pays between 0.03 and 0.06 percent of
its  deposits,  according to its risks. The insurance covers  up to  10,000 dollars for each
person who holds money in a checking account, savings account, and/or time deposits up
to  90  days. Furthernore,  the insurance covers  up  to  an  additional  10,000 dollars per
person for deposits of at least 90 days. The deposit insurance does not cover deposits that
receive an interest rate of 2 percentage points higher than the interest rate published by
the central bank. Any deposits that receive extra  incentives beyond the interest rate are
also exempted from the insurance.
11) President Menem  was reelected - May  15. 1995: Even though the economy
was in  a deep recession, President Menem was  reelected.  His political campaign was
based on the need to maintain price stability and to continue with the economic reforms.
12) Finance minister Domingo Cavallo was replaced  by central bank president
Roque Fernandez  - July 26. 1997: After several weeks of political  turmoil between the
14finance  minister  and  other political  sectors,  President  Menem  decided  to  change his
finance  minister.  He  appointed  central bank  president  Roque  Fernandez  as  the new
finance minister.
IV. Short-Run  and Long-Run  Impact  of Announcements  and News
This section studies the impact of the announcements and news (described above) on the
rates of growth  of Argentina's  financial variables.  Several papers  look at the effect of
announcements and news on capital markets. Some of these papers use the event study
methodology to measure the impact of announcements--like  earning announcements--on
equity prices. This methodology investigates whether returns are abnormally high across
firms after certain announcements. A description of the event study methodology can be
found in Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997).
Another set of papers focuses on the effect of macroeconomic armouncements on
capital markets. These papers study how the release of information  is transmitted to the
markets and what  types of news impact the markets. For example,  Hardouvelis (1988)
finds that exchange rates and interest rates respond primarily to monetary news. Harvey
and Huang (1991) study foreign exchange markets and attribute the increased volatility to
macroeconomic  news  announcements. Elmendorf,  Hirschfeld,  and  Weil  (1992) show,
from another  perspective,  that major  historic  news  affect  bond  price  movements, but
explain  only  a  small  fraction  of  those  movements.  Berry  and  Howe  (1994)  find  a
significant relationship between public informnation  and trading volume on the New York
Stock Exchange. Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) find that the number of announcements
by  Dow  Jones  and  the  stock  market  activity  are  directly  related--even  though  the
relationship is weak  (as found in other studies). Jones, Lamont,  and Lumsdaine (1996)
find that  conditional  volatility  and excess  returns  on daily  bond  prices  are higher on
"Acknowledging  the extent  of the crisis, the World Bank  approved in record time its participation in the
fiduciary fund.
15(predetermined)  announcement days. This might be due to trading or to the infornation-
gathering process. Similar results are found by Ederington and Lee (1993).
In this paper we cannot follow the methodology used  in previous  papers. There
are  not  enough  experiences  to  evaluate  the  same  type  of  announcements  in  several
occasions.  However,  we  are able  to  investigate which  role  announcements  and news
played in modifying the negative dynamics triggered by the Mexican peso devaluation. In
order to do so, we model the behavior of the stock market index, Brady bond prices, and
the interest rate. Then, we look for structural breaks to determine whether the changes in
regime  coincide with the  days the markets received the news. We also perform  out-of-
sample forecasts to evaluate how markets would have behaved without announcements.
Finally, we introduce two dummy variables per announcement or news to  quantify their
effect on each market.
IV.a. Modeling Argentina's  Financial  Variables
Separate models are estimated for each variable, controlling for the behavior of domestic
and foreign variables. The regressors include variables believed to explain  each market,
namely,  past  changes  of  the  endogenous  variable,  past  changes  of  other  Argentine
financial variables, and changes in other countries'  financial variables.  (The latter reflect
changes in the international financial environment.) 12
Unit  root  tests  indicate  that almost all variables are non-stationary.  Augmented
Dickey-Fuller  tests  reject  the  hypothesis  of  non-stationarity  for  the  financial  sector
reserves and the call interest rate. Given that the domestic variables might be linked to the
external variables  by  a stationary  linear long-run relationship,  we  have also  tested for
cointegration, following Johansen (1991). We failed to find cointegration,  so we decided
to work with  models  in  first differences. The variables  found to  be I(O), integrated of
order zero, are included in levels.13
12 As part of the foreign  variables we constructed  a stock market  index and a bond index, which  include
Brazil, Chile, and Mexico (the three countries we believe Argentina  is most connected  to). The indexes
have  been weighted  by the relative sizes of each  country.
16The type of models that we work with is:
ArYentina  = a  +  Ay  NjArgentina  +  E  Y 2 jAYF,  -.I +  t  CJJAXf 1 +
8 t.
,=,  f=  j=1  f =1 j=i
yArgentina  stands for the endogenous Argentine  financial  variable:  the stock market index,
Brady bond prices, and a  peso-deposit interest rate.  YExtewal stands for the foreign
variable: the Mexican exchange rate and Brady bond prices, an index of Latin American
bond prices, and the U.S. T-bill bond price. Note that all the variables in the regressions
are logarithms.
Each model has F exogenous variables  Xf .These are variables for which there is
daily data. We also believe  that these variables  are exogenous  (when  lagged)  and are
relevant to  explain  the  endogenous  variable.  Foreign variables  are  contemporaneous,
because they are believed to be exogenously determined. Domestic variables  are lagged,
although we have also estimated the contemporaneous relationship using two-stage least
squares. We follow the general-to-specific methodology to determine the number of lags.
We  first  include  several  lags  and  then  exclude  most  of  the  insignificant  ones.  The
estimations are reported in Section IV.c, where the dummy variables are included.
IV.h In Search of Structural  Breaks
After determining the correct model  for each variable, we evaluate the  stability of the
coefficients during the  crisis.  The  goal  of  this  exercise is  to  investigate  whether  the
announcements and news released during the crisis helped reduce the external spillovers.
In order to search for structural breaks  in the coefficients we compute  recursive
least squares. This methodology  estimates  an initial model and  re-estimates  the model
repeatedly, using larger subsamples in every repetition. In each estimate a one-step ahead
forecast is computed. The residuals are scaled such that the variance is constant.
The  residuals  of  the  different  models  are plotted  in  Figure  2  for  the  period
December  19, 1994 to  mid  1995. Most of the residuals lie within  the (+/-  2  standard
deviation) confidence interval, except during the period of announcements. In fact, during
13 The failure to find cointegration is consistent with the plots of the Argentine and the other Latin American
17the days of major announcements the residuals fall outside the bands. For instance, after it
was announced that deposits were being  dollarized, the residuals suggest that the stock
and bond markets rose while the interest rate decreased. When news about the imminent
agreement with the IMEF  became public,  our estimates yield a positive  reaction  of the
stock  and  bond  markets,  and  an  increase  of  the  interest  rate.  The  results  from  the
recursive least squares are consistent with Table 3, which displays the percent  change in
each financial variable on the announcement days.t4
As another way to shed some light on how news affected the markets we perform
out-of-sample  forecasts.  In  order  to  compute  the  forecasts, we  estimate  each  of  the
models up to the day before any announcements were made (December 27,  1994). Then
we calculate out-of-sample  forecasts for the following 6-month period. The purpose of
these forecasts is to show how the variables appear to would have behaved if the markets
had not received any announcements or news (namely, if the government had  remained
inactive after the crisis).
The out-of-sample forecasts are plotted in Figure 3. The figure displays the actual
and forecasted values of the stock market index, Brady bonds, and interest rate. The  plots
show that the actual values outperform the forecasted ones. In other words, once the crisis
was initiated the capital markets would have performed much worse if the government
had not taken an active role. The stock  market  and the bond markets  would  have not
recovered as they did, and the interest rate would have remained higher.
Figure 3 also shows that the forecasted values of the Argentine bond prices and
interest rates resemble the performance of the Mexican bond prices and interest rates. For
instance, in the absence of announcements the bond prices would have partially recovered
(probably pushed by the  other  Latin  American  bond prices).  On the  other  hand,  the
forecasted values of  the stock  market  prices  are much  lower than  the Argentine  and
Mexican actual values after March 1995. This suggests that the dynamics generated
variables,  where  we can observe  divergence  after the Mexican  crisis.
14 During  March I and 2 the residuals  for the stock and bond models  fall below  the lower  band, whereas  the
residuals  for the interest  rate models lie above the upper band. On March 3, the reverse  happens.  This last
example  shows  that not all changes  in the residuals  can be clearly  identified  with  particular announcements.
During  those  days,  the debate  about the future of the convertibility  plan  intensified  in the media.
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19Table 3
Reaction of Capital Markets on Days of Announcements and News
Percentage Change in Prices
Announcement  and News  Bonds  Stocks  Int. Rate
12/28/94  -Reserve  requirements  in dollars  were relaxed  0.00%  -0.15%  5.97%
01/12/95  -Bank deposits in the central  bank were dollarized  15.94%  10.40%  0.52%
01/31/95  - Reserve  requirements  were increased  10.65%  7.07%  5.69%
02/03/95  -Rediscounts  were limited  1.49%  -0.80%  -0.34%
02/27/95  -Modification  of the central  bank charter  -0.47%  -5.24%  6.69%
o  02/28/95  -Reserve  requirements  were increased  -0.47%  -1.26%  -0.61%
03/10/95  -Announcement  of an agreement  with the IMF  9.30%  12.83%  32.82%
03/28/95  -Creation  of a fiduciary  fund  0.48%  1.53%  -3.63%
04/12/95  -Establishment  of a deposit  insurance  scheme  0.23%  0.77%  0.52%
05/15/95  -President  Menem  was  reelected  2.43%  1.81%  -3.39%
Average 12/20/94  to 05/12/95  2.44%  3.21%  7.29%
07/26/96  -Finance  minister  was replaced  -0.57%  4.10%  -1.63%
Average  04/25/96  to 07/25/96  0.62%  1.07%  2.11%Figure 3
Out-of-Sample  Forecast: 12/27/94  - 6130/95
(The Forecast Exclude the Effects of All the Announcements and News)
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21between December  1994 and March 1995 would have caused the Argentine stock  prices
to fall even fiurther.  The recovery  of stock  market prices after mid March suggests  that  the
announcements  substantially  changed  the behavior of stock market prices. However,  the
difference  between actual and forecasted  values might also be explained  by other factors
not captured  by the models.
To sum up, Figure 2 and Table 3 insinuate that the dollarization  of deposits  and
the agreement with the IMF, among other announcement,  had a positive impact  on the
capital markets. Figure 3 suggests that the announcements  jointly had a very positive
effect  on the capital markets.' 5 In the rest of the paper we measure the short-run  and long-
run effects  of each policy announcement  and  news on the markets.
IV.c. Measuring  the Impact  of Each Announcement  and News
In order to measure the short-run and long-run effects on capital markets, we construct
two dummy variables for each announcement  and news. We have read all the Argentine
newspapers  to determine the days in which announcements  and news became public.  The
dummy  variables  take the values zero or one. The short-run  dummy  variables are defined
as follows:  D'k,a=  and DYk,a+1=1,  where a is the day the announcement  was released,
while k defines the announcement.  The short run includes both the day of and the day
after  the announcement,  to account  for the moment  the news appeared in the printed  press
and because some announcements  were made after the markets closed. The long-run
dummy  variables are defined as D'r, =J for all t2a. Note that our specifications  calculate
the impact  on the rates of growth,  thus a short-term  effect  implies a long-term shift  on the
level of the variables.
Some exceptions  are made in the definition  of the dummy variables.  The variable
deposit  guarantee is equal to 1 during  the period March 19 to April 13. At that time, the
press  was  reporting both  about the  creation of  a  fiduciary fund  and  about the
establishment  of deposit insurance.  It would  be difficult to disentangle the two effects,  so
15  It is also very likely that the announcements  have--directly  or indirectly--affected  the real side of the
economy.
22we  include  both  of  them  in  the deposit guarantee  variable.'6 In  the  case  of reserve
requirements,  we use  the  actual requirement  level instead  of  a  dummy  variable. We
include  two  quantitative  (rather  than qualitative) variables  to  reflect  how  the  reserve
requirements policy changed over time.
The models we estimate are the following:
AyArgentna =-a  +'VD  +,Y 1 ,Ay  ei.  + i  FY 2 IA  A3  z  iE
1=1  f=I  j=I  f=I  j=1
As  mentioned before,  YArgeAtina  stands  for the endogenous Argentine  financial  variable,
while  YEten  stands for the foreign variable.
In all the regressions,  our interest focuses on the estimates of  D. These estimates
are the coefficient of  D"  and Dkt, which stand for the short-run  and long-run effect of
announcements  and  news,  and  for the  impact of different  reserve  requirement  levels.
When  pk  is  statistically  different  from  zero,  we  interpret  the  corresponding
announcement  and  news  to  have  a  significant  impact  in  explaining  the  dependent
variable.
Table  4  displays  the  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  estimates,  using  robust
estimates of the standard errors. 17 The models include lagged values of the endogenous
variable, as well as contemporaneous and lagged values of the foreign variables. The lags
that repeatedly appeared  to be statistically insignificant across specifications  have been
excluded. Robust results for each variable can be summarized as follows.
a) Stock Market Index: Three dummy variables appear statistically significant and
with  positive  sign  across  multiple  specifications. The  agreement  with  the  LMF is
statistically  significant  both  in  the  short  run  and  in  the  long  run.  The  size  of  the
coefficients  is  also  large  relative  to  the  other variables.  The  short-run  effect  of the
agreement has an estimated impact of around 7 percent. The dollarization  of deposits is
the third variable that  always appears significant in the short-run behavior  of the stock
16 On  January  12,  February  27, and  March  10  there  were  several  announcements.  However,  the  dollarization
of deposits,  the reform  of the central  bank charter,  and the agreement  with the IMF were the ones that
received  all  the  attention  from  the  press,  economists,  and  policymakers.  That  is why  we  assign  any  change
in those  days to the mentioned  variables.
17  Starting  dates vary, see Appendix  for details.
23market index. On the other hand, the variables rediscount  policy and the reform of the
central  bank charter  have negative  effects on stock market  prices.
Among the other exogenous variables, we find that the Mexican stock market
index is highly  correlated  with the Argentine stock market  index. The Mexican exchange
rate also seems  to affect  the Argentine  stock market index.  A devaluation  in Mexico has a
negative effect on the Argentine stocks. U.S. bond prices are significant and positively
correlated  with the stock  market index.
b) Brady  Bonds  prices: The three dummy  variables  that are statistically  significant
and positive in the stock market equation have the same effect on bond prices. In other
words, the agreement  with the IMF has a positive short-run  and long-run impact on the
bond prices' growth  rate, and the dollarization  of deposits  has a positive short-run  effect.
Other announcements  and news also turn out to be significant in different bond
equations. Lowering  reserve requirements positively affects bond prices. The finance
ministry had predicted that lower reserves would have a  stimulating effect on  the
economy--the  bond market appears to have immediately  reacted to that prediction. The
deposit guarantee  and the fiduciary fund for bank capitalization  appear to have had a
negative  effect  on bond prices, although  this effect disappears  under some specifications.
The rediscount policy positively affects bond  prices in  the  short run.  Lastly, the
presidential  election  seems to have a mild positive short-run  effect  on bond prices under a
number  of specifications.  The change of finance minister  has a negative short-term effect
on bond  prices.
Among  the exogenous  variables, we find that the Mexican  Brady bond prices are
positively  correlated  with the Argentine  ones. U.S. bond prices and liquid reserves  of the
financial  system  are also significantly  related to the change  in bond prices.
c) Interest Rate: Some announcements  and news appear consistently significant
across the interest rate regressions. Among them, reserve requirements  are statistically
significant.  The estimations  show  that the greater the cash  banks are able to use, the lower
the interest  rate. The dollarization  of deposits also seems  to lower  the peso interest
24Table 4
The Impact of Announcements and News on Capital Markets: OLS Estimates - Robust Standard  Errors
All Variables are First Differences except the Ones Marked with (#) and the Announcement Variables
Dependent  Variable:  Stock Market  Index  Dependent Variable:  Bond Prices  Dependent Variable:  Interest  Rates
Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic
Constant  0.003  0.291  Constant  0.008  1.748  *  Constant  -0.071  -2.579  *
ARG.STOCKS  (-4)  0.021  0.650  ARG.BONDS  (-1)  -0.023  -0.799  ARG.BONDS  (-1)  -0.342  -2.079  **
ARG.STOCKS  (-2)  -0.100  -2.633  *  ARG.BONDS  (-2)  -0.077  -1.141  ARG.BONDS  (-2)  -0.374  -2.386  * MEX.STOCKS  0.326  6.874  *  ARG.BONDS  (-3)  -0.106  -3.011  *  ARC.BONDS (-3)  -0.201  -1.284
MEX.STOCKS  (-1)  0.125  2.921  *  ARG.RESERVES  FIN.SYSTEM  (-4)  -0.011  -2.324  **  ARG.BONDS  (-4)  -0.238  -1.980  + MEX.EXCHANGE  RATE  -0.149  -3.146  *  MEX.BONDS  0.776  19.216  *  ARG.DEPOSITS  (-4)  -0.507  -1.707  ** MEX.EXCHANGE  RATE  (-1)  -0.095  -2.357  *  MEX.BONDS  (-1)  0.095  1.976  *4  ARG.DEPOSITS  (-2)  -0.038  -0.115
MEX.EXCHANGE  RATE  (-2)  -0.114  -2.763  *  MEXBONDS (-2)  0.067  1.029  ARG.INTEREST  RATE  (-I)  -0.693  -9.650  *
USA  BONDS  0.258  1.870  *  MEX.BONDS  (-3)  0.135  2.711  *  ARG.INTEREST  RATE  (-2)  -0.362  -5.811  *
MEX.BONDS  (4)  -0.017  -0:593  ARG.INTEREST  RATE  (-3)  -0.143  -2.719  *
MEX.BONDS  (-5)  0.068  2.144  ARG.INTEREST  RATE  (4)  -0.051  -1.157
USA BONDS  0.193  3.148  *  ARG.CALL  RATE (-1) #  0.020  1.446
USA BONDS (-1)  0.066  2.610  *  ARG.CALL  RATE (-2) #  0.012  0.688
ARG.CALL  RATE (-3) #  0.022  1.155
ARG.CALL  RATE (4)  #  -0.025  -1.859  *
LATIN  AM.BONDS  0.128  0.883
LATIN  AM.BONDS (-I)  0.124  0.722
LATIN  AM.BONDS (-2)  0.284  1.555
LATIN  AM.BONDS (-3)  -0.229  -1.319
LATIN  AM.BONDS (-4)  0.259  1.897  *
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS  -0.000  -0.377  RESERVE REQUIREMENTS  -0.000  -1.759  +  RESERVE REQUIREMENTS  0.001  0.775
CASH IN BANKS  0.000  0.041  CASH IN BANKS  0.000  0.593  CASH IN BANKS  -0.001  -2.094  *
DOLLARIZATION  0.003  0.657  DOLLARIZATION  -0.003  -0.543  DOLLARIZATION  0.008  0.494
DOLLARIZATION  ST  0.045  7.758  *  DOLLARIZATION  ST  0.023  3.384  *  DOLLARIZATION  ST  -0.118  -6.791  * REDISCOUNTS  -0.013  -1.399  REDISCOUNTS  -0.003  -0.505  REDISCOUNTS  -0.011  -0.557 REDISCOUNTS  ST  -0.015  -1.932  ""*  REDISCOUNTS  ST  0.011  2.522  +  REDISCOUNTS  ST  0.029  1.675  * CENTRAL  BANK  CHARTER  -0.004  -0.345  CENTRAL  BANK  CIIARTER  -0.003  -0.414  CENTRAL BANK  CIIARTER  0.038  1.267 CENTRAL  BANK  CHARTER  -0.030  -3.589  *  CENTRAL  BANK  CHARTER  ST  -0.010  -1.429  CENTRAL  BANK CHARTER  0.039  1.254 AGREEMENT  IMF  0.030  2.824  *  AGREEMENT  IMF  0.022  2.252  +  AGREEMENT  IMF  -0.039  -0.981
AGREEMENT  IMF ST  0.067  7.541  *  AGREEMENT  IMF ST  0.020  2.159  *  AGREEMENT IMF ST  0.115  2.302 DEPOSITS  GUARANTEE  -0.011  -1.359  DEPOSITS  GUARANTEE  -0.018  -2.298  *  DEPOSITS GUARANTEE  0.032  1.865  * DEPOSITS  GUARANTEE  ST  -0.008  -1.293  DEPOSITS  GUARANTEE  ST  -0.003  -0.717  DEPOSITS GUARANTEE  ST  0.006  0.568
PRESIDENT  RE-ELECTION  -0.006  -1.006  PRESIDENT  RE-ELECTION  -0.002  -0.602  PRESIDENT  RE-ELECTION  -0.014  -1.065
PRESIDENT  RE-ELECTION  -0.011  -1.547  PRESIDENT  RE-ELECTION  ST  0.010  2.625  *  PRESIDENT  RE-ELECTION  -0.053  -4.212  *
FINANCE  MINISTER  0.001  0.458  FINANCE  MINISTER  CHANGE  0.001  1.130  FINANCE  MINISTER  -0.002  -0.768
FINANCE  MINISTER  -0.011  -1.066  FINANCE  MINISTER  CHANGE  ST  -0.004  -3.050  *  FINANCE  MINISTER  -0.016  -2.495  *
Adjusted R-squared  0.149  Adjusted R-squared  0.566  Adjusted R-squared  0.351
SE of regression  0.022  SE of regression  0.009  SE of regression  0.039
Log likelihood  3482  Log likelihood  4058  Log likelihood  1904
F-statistic  11.50  F-statistic  58.45  F-statistic  17.01
ST: Short Term. *,  [1**: Sienificant  at the 1. (5). 1101  percent confidence level.rate in the short run. On the other hand, the agreement with the IMF raises the interest
rate in the short run--as if the markets perceived that the agreement implied a tighter
monetary  policy. However,  the long-run  effect is negative (although  it is only significant
in some specifications).  Two other variables  are sometimes  significant.  The reform of the
central bank charter and the deposit insurance variable seem to raise the interest rate,
while the presidential  election is negatively correlated with the interest rate in the short
run.
We also control for the overnight interest rate, total deposits, and bond prices,
which turn to have the right sign and are mostly significant. As a foreign variable we
control for the index  of Latin  American  bonds.
The reported results are robust to various specifications.  They mostly agree with
previous results found in Ganapolsky  (1996). We have estimated  the above models  using
different lag structures.  We have also estimated  the contemporaneous  relationship  among
the Argentine financial variables using two-stage least squares. Moreover, we have
estimated the models as seemingly  unrelated regressions (SUR), since there is potential
cross-correlation  among  the equations.  Finally, as part of the sensitivity  analysis,  we have
computed another set  of  models. In  these  estimations we  calculate the  long-run
relationship  between the endogenous  variable and each exogenous  variable. The dummy
variables  that are significant  in the reported models remain mostly significant  across  the
other specification.  The only difference  arises in the instrumental  variable regressions,
because  we failed  to find good  instruments.
V. The Impact  of Announcements  and News on Volatility
In the previous sections  we have analyzed  the impact of news on the first moments  of the
variables. However, the residuals from the previous models show some clustering in
volatility. There are periods where volatility is low and periods where volatility is high
(particularly  in the aftermath  of the Mexican devaluation).  These residuals suggest that
the variance  is not constant  over time. Therefore  we estimate  the behavior  of the variance
26using  generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models--
frequently applied in  finance. Jones, Lamont, and Lumsdaine (1996) use a similar
approach  to study the effect  of news on the bond market volatility.
The models  we estimate  have  the following  specifications:
AyArgenhina = a  +,  +  Ir  yArgentina  +  A  Y2I  EY.tej  +  E  f,t-i  f
1=1  f=I  j=I  f=1 j=I
Et  N(O,  a  )
L  L
2  1rwr  62  +  Ir  a
at  =  @ + T:'ID, +Erik£  t-  +E2i  _Jt
k=l  j=l
In each model the variance at t depends on four elements: a constant term w,
exogenous  factors  given by the news variables  D,, past variances aor  and past shocks  to
volatility  given by  k.
GARCH models have one main advantage over the models used previously.
These models enable us to test whether  the announcements  and news have an impact  on
volatility.  In other  words, we can now estimate if financial  variables  become  more or less
stable after the markets receive new information. Also, by  explicitly specifying the
variance  of s,,  GARCH  models  yield  efficient estimates  of the parameters  a, 0, y, and K.
In a world of risk averse investors, we expect that when volatility decreases
(increases) after some news, the present value of the  assets should react positively
(negatively)  the day of the announcement.  However, markets do not always anticipate
what happens to future volatility.  Then, GARCH models allow us to see--even  for the
cases where the markets do not discount the  future change in  volatility--if  markets
become  more tranquil  or more  agitated  after the announcements.
We have computed GARCH estimates assuming and not  assuming normally
distributed  errors.  The quasi-maximum  likelihood  estimations--which  compute  consistent
covariances  (following  Bollerslev  and Wooldridge,  1992)--are  displayed  in Tables  5. The
specifications  GARCH (1,1) and GARCH (2,2) seem to capture the variability  in the
variance; no further lags appear significant. We exclude all variables that repeatedly
turned out to be non-significant  in the estimations,  since the large number  of parameters
27Table 5
The Impact of Announcements and News on Capital Markets: GARCH Estimates - Robust Standard  Errors
All Variables are First Differences except the Ones Marked with (#) and the Announcement Variables
Degendent Variable:  Stock Market Index  Dependent Variable:  Bond Prices  Denendent Variable:  Interest Rates
Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic Constant  0.001  1.824.  +  Constant  0.004  2.052  *  Constant  -0.058  -6.173 ARG.STOCKS  (-I)  0.045  1.701  *  ARG.BONDS  (-I)  0.030  1.037  ARG.I3ONDS  (-I)  -0.064  -0.571 ARG.STOCKS  (-2)  -0.085  -3.043  *  ARG.BONDS  (-2)  0.009  0.307  ARG.BONDS  (-2)  -0.186  -1.824 MEX.STOCKS  0.367  10.674  *  ARG.BONDS  (-3)  -0.095  -3.521  *  ARG.DEPOSITS  (-I)  -0.352  -2.011 MEX.STOCKS  (-1)  0.129  3.548  *  ARG.RESERVES  FIN.SYSTEM  (-1)  -0.005  -1.213  ARG.INTEREST  RATE (-1)  -0.645  17.881 MEX.EXCHANGE  RATE  -0.140  -3.773  *  MEX.BONDS  0.798  24.563  *  ARG.INTEREST  RATE  (-2)  -0.407  -10.748 MEX.EXCHANGERATE(-I)  -0.078  -1.588  MEX.13ONDS  (-1)  0.038  0.990  ARG.INTEREST  RATE  (-3)  -0.185  -5.080 MEX.EXCHANGE  RATE  (-2)  -0.126  -2.608  *  MEXBONDS (-2)  -0.052  -1.292  ARG.INTEREST  RATE (4)  -0.104  -3.276 USA BONDS  0.228  2.582  MEX.BONDS  (-3)  0.176  4.123  *  ARG.CALL  RATE (-4)  0.031  6.073
USABONDS  0.165  4.612  *  LATINAM.BONDS  0.084  0.866
USA  BONDS (-I)  0.091  3.357  *  LATIN  AM.BONDS  (-I)  0.075  0.642
LATIN AM.BONDS  (-2)  0.093  0.766
LATIN  AM.BONDS (-3)  -0.141  -1.526
tQ  DOLLARIZATION  ST  0.043  3.868  *  RESERVE REQUIREMENTS  -0.000  -1.909  **  CASH IN BANKS  -0.000  -2.708 00  REDISCOUNTS  ST  -0.033  -5.453  *  DOLLARIZATION  ST  0.004  0.287  DOLLARIZATION  ST  -0.107  4.280
CENTRAL  BANK  CHARTER  ST  -0.052  -3.404  *  AGREEMENT  IMF ST  0.038  2.152  **  PRESIDENT RE-ELECTION  ST  -0.058  -2.407 AGREEMENT  IMF ST  0.077  8.486  *  DEPOSITS  GUARANTEE  -0.002  -1.733  *
Variance Eauation  Variance Eauation  Variance Equation
Constant  0.000  3.050  *  Constant  0.000  2.756  *  Constant  0.001  3.006  * ARCH(I)  0.109  2.904  *  ARCH(I)  0.010  0564  ARCH(I)  0.133  3.840  * ARCH(2)  0.136  3.818  *  ARCH(2)  0.181  3.251  *  GARCII(I)  0.782  17.531  * GARCH(I)  0.027  0.122  GARCH(I)  0.159  1.698  **  RESERVE REQUIREMENTS  -0.000  -2.561  * GARCH(2)  0.673  3.461  *  GARCH(2)  0.601  6.419  *  CASH IN BANKS  0.000  2.382 FINANCE  MINISTER  CHANGE  -0.000  -2.001  **  FINANCE  MINISTER  CHANGE  -0.000  -2.123  **  AGREEMENT  IMF  -0.000  -3.093
Adjusted R-squared  0.142  Adjusted R-squared  0.538  Adjusted R-squared  0.306 SE of regression  0.022  SE of regression  0.009  SE of regression  0.041 Log likelihood  3736  Log likelihood  4231  Log  likelihood  2119 F-statistic  14.18  F-statistic  73.05  F-statistic  22.80
ST: Short Tern
X, (5*), I**1:  Significant  at the 1,  (5), j I 01  percent confidence  level.makes the convergence  difficult. Therefore, we chose to report only the parsimonious
specifications.
GARCH estimation  results can be summarized as follows. The volatility  of the
stock  market and bond market behave  in a similar way. They are affected  by mainly  one
exogenous  variable, the change  of minister--which  decreases  the long-run  volatility  in the
stock and bond markets. In the interest rate equation, more variables appear to be
statistically significant. The agreement  with the IMF decreases the volatility. The two
variables that capture reserve requirements are  statistically significant and have the
expected sign. A decrease in reserve  requirements  increases the volatility  of the interest
rate, although  it increases  bond prices and it reduces  the interest rate.
The GARCH  models  yield  the following  results for the announcement  variables  in
the first moment equations. The model for the stock market shows that most of the
variables  that appeared significant  in the OLS estimation remain significant  here. In the
model for bond prices, the significant  announcement  variables are: reserve  requirements,
the agreement with the.IMF, and the deposit guarantee and the fiduciary  fund. In the
interest rate  equation, reserve requirements, the  dollarization of  deposits, and the
presidential  election  remain statistically  significant.
VI. Summary  of Results  and Conclusions
Argentina was hit hard by the Mexican peso devaluation of  December  20, 1994. In
response to  the spillover effects, Argentine policymakers pursued an active policy to
revert the crisis by trying to send the right signals to the markets. Monetary  policy  has
been constrained due to the currency board system (under which 80 percent of the
monetary  base needed to be backed  by international  reserves during 1995).  Nevertheless,
Argentina successfully prevented a financial crash without abandoning its peg to the
dollar.
This paper analyzed  Argentina's  crisis management  during the tequila  effect.  We
showed that Argentina's capital markets seemed to have performed better than if no
29active  policies  had  been  taken.  We  also  estimated  the  impact  of  each  policy
announcement and news on the Argentine capital markets. We studied their impact on the
short-run and long-run returns and on the markets'  volatility. We worked with  the stock
market index, Brady bond prices, and the interest rate. Our results can be summarized as
follows.
The  agreement  with  the  OMF seems  to  be  one  of  the  most  significant
announcement the markets  received.  Both  the  stock and bond  market  returns  reacted
positively.  The short  run  interest  rate  increased,  while its  volatility  decreased.  These
reactions suggest that the markets perceived the agreement as being beneficial  in the long
run, but with a short-run tightening of domestic credit. We believe that the  agreement
with the IMF not only implied additional  funding for the country, but  also  signaled to
markets that sound policies were going  to be  adopted. In addition, the agreement  gave
international support to the way the government was dealing with the crisis. Note that the
impact of this announcement is significant even after controlling for changes in foreign
markets. Mexico's  financial agreement with  the  IMF  and with the U.S. was announced
around the same time, which seemed to have positively impacted the entire region.
Among the  other  announcements,  the  dollarization of  deposits  also  positively
impacted the returns of the stock  market  and the bond market.  At the same  time, the
dollarization  decreased  the  interest  rate.  Lower  reserve requirements  increased  bond
prices (perhaps because they provided a stimulus to the economy) and reduced the interest
rate. However, they seem to have increased the volatility of the interest rate. The fiduciary
fund for bank capitalization and the deposit insurance scheme seem to have pushed bond
prices downward and to have increased the interest rate. The presidential election appears
to  have decreased  the  interest  rate  and  increased  the value  of  Brady  bonds.  When
significant, the reform of the central bank  charter appears to have a negative  effect on
capital markets, increasing the interest rate  and reducing the value of stocks  and bonds.
The effect of the rediscount policy is ambiguous. This variable negatively affects stock
prices and interest rates, while it positively affects bond prices.
The change of minister calmed down the stock and bond markets as estimated in
the GARCH models. The markets'  nervousness about what was going to happen the day
30after Mr. Cavallo left the finance ministry appear now to have been unjustified. The stock
and bond markets calmed down when the new minister was appointed, but the short-run
effect on bond prices is negative. Higher reserve requirements and the agreement with the
IMF seem to decrease the volatility of interest rates.
To  conclude,  the  capital  markets  recovered  when  they  received  signals  that
Argentina's  fundamentals were  good.  There  was  a  differentiation in  returns  between
Argentina  and Mexico. The markets  welcomed  the signals that  demonstrated  a strong
commitment to the existing exchange rate peg  and economic program. In this sense, the
agreement with the IMF, the  dollarization  of deposits,  and the reelection  of President
Menem were welcomed by the markets. On the other hand, measures like the reform of
the central bank charter, which gave more discretionary power to the central bank, appear
to have had a negative effect.
We hope that this case study provides  some lessons for future crisis management
situations. When enough experiences have accumulated, it would be worthwhile testing
whether the impact of each announcement  have the same effect across countries. Some
Asian countries like Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea already signed
agreements with the IMF (for much larger amounts than 7 billion dollars). However, their
capital markets did not react positively to  these agreements. It would be useful  to learn
under which circumstances certain policies  have a positive effect. Do these agreements
need to be signed simultaneously, like Argentina and Mexico did? Do countries need to
show  some commitment to  confront the crisis  besides  calling the IMF,  like Argentina
did? Do policymakers need to signal to markets that they really support the agreements?
We believe that these are all interesting topics for future research.
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33Appendix: Data Description
The data sources are the Central Bank of Argentina and Bloomberg. The series
cover the period January 2, 1992 - July 10, 1997, except when indicated.
We work with the following variables:
1. Stock Markets:
Argentina:  Merval Index
Brazil:  Bovespa Index
Chile:  IPSA Index
Mexico:  IPC Index
USA:  Dow Jones Index
Latin America:  We have constructed a stock market index,
including Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. The index
is weighted by the relative GDP of each country.
2. Bond Markets:
Argentina:  Discount bond price index
Brazil:  Discount bond price index
Mexico:  Discount bond price index
USA:  US Treasury price index (maturity
November 2021)
Latin America:  We have constructed a bond market index,
including Brazil, and Mexico. The index is
weighted by the relative GDP of each country.
Argentina's bond index starts on September 24, 1992, Brazil's one on June 28, 1993.
Mexico's and US's series start on January 2, 1992.
3. Money Markets:
Argentina:  Time deposits in pesos, 30 to 59 days
Call in pesos, 7 days (interbank market)
Mexico:  Time deposits in pesos, 60 days
USA:  CD in dollars, 1 month
The Mexican data start on September 29, 1992, call interest rate on January 28, 1992, and
the others on January 2, 1992.
4. Argentine Financial System:
Fulfillment of reserve requirements (stock) and stock of international reserves
held by the Central Bank. Both series end in June 25, 1997.
5. Mexican exchange rate (peso/dollar)
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